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DIALETHEISM, PARADOX, AND
NĀGĀRJUNA’S WAY OF THINKING
RICHARD H. JONES
ABSTRACT: Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, his ideas on “two truths” and language,
and his general method of arguing are presented clearly by him and can be stated without
paradox. That the dialetheists today can restate his beliefs in paradoxical ways does not
mean that Nāgārjuna argued that way; in fact, their restatements misrepresent and undercut
his arguments.
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Today dialetheists in philosophy of logic argue that the law of noncontradiction can
be violated in some paradoxes because some contradictions at the limits of our
knowledge are true and that there may be adequate grounds for holding explicitly
contradictory beliefs in those cases. Graham Priest (2002; 2004) argues that all
attempts at closure at the boundaries of thought and of what is knowable in science
lead to contradictions—any conceptual process crossing those boundaries results in
the paradoxes of self-reference—but that these contradictions in fact state truths, and
something contradictory about reality itself renders such contradictory statements
true. Thus, there is “cogent inconsistency” (Garfield and Priest 2009, 81).
Jay Garfield, Graham Priest, and Yasuo Deguchi apply contemporary dialetheist
ideas to the second- or third-century CE Buddhist Nāgārjuna (beginning with Garfield
and Priest 2003). They are not arguing that Nāgārjuna was irrational or confused, but
that there are things about reality at the “limits of thought” in the Madhyamaka
worldview that cannot be expressed consistently. They explicitly state that
Madhyamaka thought is “inconsistent” and that
…Madhyamaka is profound precisely because it dares to go where no philosophers have
gone before—or at least with such care: to the limits of being, thought, and
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language, to face the paradoxes that lie at those limits, and to demonstrate that those and
to demonstrate that those paradoxes show that reality itself is paradoxical (DGP 2013b,
396).1

But it will be argued here that there is a consistency to Nāgārjuna’s thought and
that introducing paradoxes into it only muddles his presentation. What he wrote is not
inconsistent or paradoxical in content when understood in terms of his overall
philosophy. It will be shown that even those of his expressions that are paradoxical in
form can be restated without paradox, and thus we cannot conclude that those
paradoxes reflect his way of thinking—in fact, nothing in his works suggests that
some truths can only be expressed in inconsistent statements.
1. THE DIALETHEISTS’ BASIC POSITION
The dialetheists assert that only early Mādhyamikas thought involved contradictions,
although they tend to speak of Madhyamaka thought in general since they believe that
their position is entailed by how they interpret Nāgārjuna’s work (DGP 2013a, 427).
But they admit that after the arrival of the Buddhist logicians Dignāga and
Dharmakīrti who explicitly endorsed the law of noncontradiction, Indian and Tibetan
Mādhyamikas stressed never accepting contradictions (ibid., 429). Nor can they point
to any Indian Buddhist commentators who accepted the alleged paradoxes. They must
argue that all later Mādhyamikas misunderstood Nāgārjuna (DGP 2013b, 396) and
indeed that we had to wait until the twenty-first century when paralogicans came
along and started applying their ideas to Nāgārjuna for anyone to see the light.2
The dialetheists have formulated new paradoxical statements in a “rational
reconstruction” of Nāgārjuna’s thought:
•
•
•

“There are no ultimate truths, and it is ultimately true that everything is
empty.”
“Things have no nature, and that is their nature.”
“There are no ultimate truths, and that is one of them” (DGP 2013a, 426).3

1

Tom Tillemans (2009; 2013) argues for a “soft dialetheism”: Nāgārjuna may treat something as real
in one place for worldly purposes (i.e., conventional truth) and unreal in another place since it is empty
(śunya) of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) (i.e., ultimate truth). That is true, but this should not be
considered a form of “dialetheism” since it avoids the key element of the conjoining of two conflicting
statements into one paradox—the same aspect of something is not both affirmed and denied at the
same time in the same way.
2
The dialetheists also see irresolvable paradoxes in the Prajñāpāramitā literature—e.g., “all
phenomena have one nature—that is, no nature” (DPG 2013b, 393). And the Perfection of Wisdom
texts does delight in paradoxes. For example, Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā 192 states that the nature
(prakṛti) of all dharmas is to have no nature. But the paradoxes in the Prajñāpāramitā texts can be
resolved and shown to have a nonparadoxical content (see Jones 2012, 220-23), including “Form is
emptiness” (ibid., 224-26).
3
To give another example, when Mark Siderits (2008) states “the ultimate truth about tables is that
there are no tables!” he needlessly introduces a paradox into a situation that can be stated consistently
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They argue that Nāgārjuna actually thought with such inconsistencies. However, the
dialetheists admit that Nāgārjuna never made those statements. Nāgārjuna, in fact,
only stated things that were completely consistent or that can be explained
consistently (possible exceptions are discussed below). Here are consistent restatements that better reflect his thought:
•
•
•

“There are ultimate truths, e.g., ‘Everything in reality is dependently-arisen
(pratῑtyasamutpāda) and empty of anything self-existent (niḥsvabhāva), and
that “that-ness” (tattva) of phenomena is the ultimate nature of what is real’.”
“The ultimate nature of things in the final analysis is that they have no selfexistence (svabhāva).”
“That reality is empty of self-existence is an ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya)
of the nature of reality as it truly is (yathābhūtam).”

Nāgārjuna never denied that something exists in the final analysis and thus is
ultimately real (tattva, paramārtha-satya, dharmatā) nor did he ever state that no
statement can express what is ultimately true (contra DGP 2013b, 396).
To claim, as the dialetheists do, that “Things have the intrinsic nature of having
no intrinsic nature” would introduce a paradox that distorts the nature of Nāgārjuna’s
arguments: to him, only things that are self-existent (svabhāva) have a separate
existence, and hence have their own intrinsic nature; and thus things that arise
dependently upon causes and conditions can have no “intrinsic nature” in that sense.
That is, dependently-arisen things do have a “nature” in the everyday sense of having
a general nature or characteristic revealed by analyzing them. All dependently-arisen
things have the general nature of being impermanent and connected to some other
phenomena, but they do not have Nāgārjuna’s metaphysically-loaded sense of
“svabhāva” of existing independently in its own right without any causes and
conditions (i.e., existing as an independent substance). In short, dependently-arisen
things are not self-contained “self-existent” realities.4
These two senses of “intrinsic nature” that must be distinguished: the general
sense of a something’s properties and Nāgārjuna’s restrictive metaphysically-loaded
sense of self-existence. We can talk about the nature of something in its final analysis
without requiring that any metaphysically entities—i.e., without self-existent
substances (svabhāva) Consider this dialetheistic claim:
(if a little cumbersomely) without one: “The ontologically correct truth about the entities that we
conventionally call ‘tables’ is that there are no such self-existent, independent entities but only empty
phenomena.” So too, we must reject his paradox: “The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”
(1989, 213, 247; 2008, 127—there is an ultimate truth about the nature of phenomenal reality: it is
empty of any self-existent entities.
4
Nāgārjuna is attacking the earlier Abhidharmist view of svabhāva. For the Abhidharmists,
“svabhāva” meant “self-nature”—i.e., each factor of the experienced world (dharma) has a unique and
independent nature—but all factors are still conditioned and temporary. Nāgārjuna apparently
mischaracterized their view by switching the focus of svabhāva to also include self-existence (see
Jones 2014, 171-177).
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•

“emptiness [śunyatā] has no intrinsic nature, and…this is its intrinsic nature.”

(DGP 2013b, 396).5 This needlessly introduces an apparent paradox by combining the
two senses of “intrinsic nature.” By playing on the ambiguity, it becomes a
paradoxical way of stating a simple point: what is dependently-arisen does not exist
as a self-existent substance (svabhāva in the metaphysically-loaded sense). That is:
•

“Things are empty of a self-existent substance (svabhāva), and that is their
reality in the final analysis.”

However, to say as the dialetheists do, that “emptiness has no svabhāva, and that is
their svabhāva” is simply wrong: what is empty of svabhāva does have a general
“nature” or “property” (being dependently-arisen), but it does not have svabhāva in
Nāgārjuna’s more restricted sense of having a self-existent substance—for Nāgārjuna,
only what is real (sat), i.e., eternal and unchanging, is self-existent and thus has a selfexistent substance (svabhāva) (MK 24.33, 24.23, 22.24; VV 67; SS 21). Thus, what is
empty of svabhāva is not self-existent and does not exist by any svabhāva-like
substance.
The dialetheists’ mistaken premise here is that “ultimate reality” must be “that
which has svabhāva” (DGP 2013a, 430) rather than merely what exists in the final
analysis (paramārtha). But according to Nāgārjuna, something does exist in the final
analysis and thus is “ultimately real”: dependently-arising phenomena of the
phenomenal realm—being free of independently-existing substances is the “thatness” (tattva) of things in the final analysis. To be empty of self-existence does not
mean nonexistent. He is offering a “middle way” (“madhyamaka” means “middlemost” in Sanskrit) between what is eternal and unchanging (sat) and what is
completely nonexistent (asat)—phenomena do exist, but they arise dependently and
thus are empty of independence and self-existence. He never denied that “dependentarising” is an indicator of the true nature of things. That is, we can speak of what is
“ultimately real” for Nāgārjuna, but we cannot restrict the phrase to only what is selfexistent. His metaphysics dictates otherwise: phenomena are not eternal and
unchanging (i.e., sat), but they nevertheless do exist in the final analysis—it is only
that they exist in a different manner (existing dependently). Nor is there anything
paradoxical in denying that phenomena are neither real (sat) nor totally nonexistent
(asat) if these two categories do not exhaust all ways of being.
In sum, Nāgārjuna (and later Indian Mādhyamikas) claimed that the nature of
things in the general sense is to be dependently-arisen. But he does not claim that they
have a self-existent essence (svabhāva) that would make them independent of
5

Concerning what is empty, they say: “ultimate truth and conventional truth constitute a mutually
exclusive and exhaustive partition of the domain of truth. But the ultimate truth is that there is no
ultimate reality, and ultimate truth, for example the truth that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic
nature, is the truth about ultimate reality. There is hence no truthmaker for ultimate truth, and hence no
ultimate truth. But that is an ultimate truth” (ibid., 395). They believe that both Nāgārjuna and
Candrakīrti “are committed to the truth of this contradiction” (ibid.).
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everything else. Thus, the dialetheists’ claim “What is empty has no intrinsic nature,
and…this is its intrinsic nature” can be unpacked as meaning one of two things:
•
•

“What is empty has no intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and that is its general
nature in the final analysis.”
“What is empty has no intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and that is its intrinsic
nature (svabhāva).”

The first restatement is true and not paradoxical and reflects Madhyamaka thought.
The second is indeed paradoxical, but it is untrue in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy: what is
empty of substance has no self-existence. He never stated “it is of the intrinsic nature
[svabhāva] of things to be empty” (contra DGP 2013a, 431). To ascribe “selfexistence” to what is dependently-arisen would violate his philosophy at its core. The
that-ness (tattva) of reality in the final analysis (paramārtha) is free of “a self-existent
substance” or “self-existence” or any other intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Nothing in
Nāgārjuna’s corpus suggests that he would say “The absence of svabhāva (i.e.,
emptiness) is the substantive core (svabhāva) of things.”6 But to dialetheists, by being
empty of self-existence something has the intrinsic nature of having no intrinsic
nature (DGP 2013b, 395). However, only by the sleight of hand of relying upon the
ambiguity of the term “intrinsic nature” as either the general category of an “ultimate
reality” (i.e., what exists in the final analysis) or Nāgārjuna’s technical sense of “selfexistence” as independent substance can the dialetheists argue for their paradoxical
restatements. Relying on an ambiguity is not only sloppy by our standards, it violates
a classical Indian rule of debate.
2. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF
NĀGĀRJUNA’S ARGUMENTATION
Nāgārjuna does not violate any of the usual laws of logic and his use of logic is very
evident in all his texts. Most importantly, he relies on the basic rules of logic to make
his arguments—Nāgārjuna’s method of arguing fails if the contrast between x and
not-x is not exclusive and exhaustive since his conclusion of emptiness as the only
alternative to anything existing by svabhāva would then not follow. Thus, if
Nāgārjuna accepted that contradictions could state a truth in some instances, as
Garfield and Priest (2003) contend, then his arguments would fail since the contradictions again would not be grounds to accept emptiness. That is, the general way
Nāgārjuna gets to emptiness is to eliminate self-existence rather than advancing
independent positive arguments for accepting emptiness (but see MK 13, 24), and so
he has to remove all logical possibilities for self-existence—if a contradiction
6

MK 22.16 states: “Whatever is the essence (svabhāva) of the Buddha, that is the essence of this
world. But the Buddha is without any essence, and this world is without any essence.” This can be
interpreted along those lines: whatever is the general nature of the Buddha is also the general nature of
this world—i.e., to be without any self-existence. That is, it is only a statement of the emptiness of
everything.
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concerning self-existence affirms a truth, his arguments would fail. (The dialetheists
realize that if contradictions are acceptable for Nāgārjuna’s own position but that the
logical contradictions he points out in his opponents’ positions decisively refute them,
then his opponents could rightly ask for reasons for this special pleading.)
Consider two basic laws of standard Aristotelean logic: the law of noncontradiction (nothing can be both x and non-x), and the law of the excluded middle
(everything is either x or non-x).7 Most people believe these laws apply to all thought
—e.g., how can someone believe that a statement is both true and false? How can a
self-contradictory statement be intelligible? And if we examine Nāgārjuna’s
arguments, we see that he implicitly relies on both laws. (He never discussed logic,
i.e., theories of what is a valid inference or deduction.) And it should be noted that,
unlike Western philosophers, Nāgārjuna speaks of a conflict of properties, not
statements—i.e., he states that something cannot be or have properties x and non-x or
that x and non-x cannot be in the same place at the same time. His focus is on the
world, not the logic of statements. For example, in MK 8.7: “’real’ and ‘unreal’ are
mutually contradictory (paraspara-viruddha)—how could they exist together
simultaneously?” (see MK 7.30, 21.3, 25.17, 25.25-27; RV 4). Obviously, an entity
(bhāva) and its absence (abhāva) cannot exist together (MK 25.14).8
Many of Nāgārjuna’s arguments proceed on the basis that x and not-x are
mutually exclusive and that there is no third possibility. So too, he implicitly utilizes
the law of the excluded middle in MK 2.15: “A mover is not stationary, just as a nonmover is not stationary. And other than a mover or a non-mover, what third
possibility is stationary?” (see MK 1.4, 2.8, 3.6, 4.6, 6.10, 8.1, 21.14; VP 50, 58, 59).
He also relies upon the standard inferences of modus ponens and modus tollens (see
Jones 2014, 159).
However, not all cases of x and not-x in Nāgārjuna’s works are like that. In some
instances, x and not-x are connected and not exhaustive—in particular, “bhava” and
“abhāva.” An abhāva results from a bhāva, and something can be neither a bhāva or
an abhāva—e.g., nirvāṇa (RV 42; SS 25). Thus, denying the existence of an entity
(bhāva) in no way logically requires affirming the absence of a real entity (abhāva).
So too, the contrast between “existence (sat)” and “nonexistence (asat)” as he defines
the terms is not exhaustive but only shows the extremes: existence in the sense of sat
is eternal existence (and hence unceasing), and nonexistence is total nonexistence
(and hence unarisen)—thus, something that comes into existence or did exist but
comes to an end does not fall into either category. But what he wants from this is that
7

Priest (2002: 5; 2006, 94-95) contends that there have been no defenses of the law of noncontradiction since Aristotle’s worth mentioning and that Aristotle’s arguments for it are not
convincing. This may be true, but the important point for this article is that Nāgārjuna was implicitly
following the law in his arguments. To do away with the law would be to do away with his method of
argumentation.
8
In Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, even the basic law of identity—x is x”—is problematic since impermanent phenomena are constantly changing: what was x is no longer the same now. He would
probably respond that this law could only apply to what is self-existent—only such permanent realities
could remain identical to themselves.
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the fact that we see things arise eliminates “nonexistence” and the fact that we see
things cease eliminates “existence.” Thus, he wants a third ontological category
between the extremes of eternal existence and total nonexistence—what is “empty” of
svabhāva.
The dialetheists may reply that they of course accept this— they are not claiming
that Nāgārjuna’s arguments are all illogical, but only that he accepted some instances
of paradoxes. However, this misses the point: logic is at the center of Nāgārjuna’s
argument. Moreover, in no place did he affirm an irresolvable paradox. This can be
seen by looking at the structure of his arguments and some apparent exceptions to
consistency.
3. NĀGĀRJUNA’S METHOD OF ARGUMENT
Nāgārjuna’s primary means of argumentation is to point out that there is a conflict
between our everyday experience of change in the world and the alleged permanence
in the svabhāva metaphysics (e.g., MK 13.3-4). This is not a scientific analysis of
how things work or the invocation of mystical experiences but simply an appeal to the
obvious: the changes that we see in our everyday experiences. A second means
involves the interconnection of phenomena (e.g., “cause” and “effect,” “fire” and
“fuel,” or “moving” and “a mover”) or the relation between an entity and its
properties (e.g., an “impassioned person” and “passion”). According to Nāgārjuna, if
concepts for these are connected then so is what they conceptualize (e.g., MK 6.1-2),
and so they are not independently real but dependently-arisen.
His overall method in his discussions of his opponents’ positions, especially in
the Vigrahavyāvartanī, is this: he starts with what he sees as his opponents’ tenets
concerning self-existence and then shows how these premises logically lead to
contradictions with either our experiences or the concepts involved. For example, he
claims that what exists by self-existence can only be either identical to something else
real or totally distinct; hence, if the oneness of two entities or their absolute difference
is not possible (e.g., a cause and its effect such as milk and butter [MK 20.19])
because we see otherwise, then the entities are empty of self-existence, and therefore
the entities are not real (sat). Thus, the initial premise—that things exist by their own
power and so is existing by itself, i.e., “self-existent”—must be wrong. Self-existence
is not found in the world of our experience and so is not “established” (siddha). Thus,
emptiness then follows automatically since he sees this as the only alternative to a
svabhāva metaphysics—i.e., he does not argue directly for emptiness but shows that
the only alternative he sees (i.e., self-existence) must be rejected. In this way, he need
not present positive arguments for a thesis or use emptiness as a reason but only
presents problems with its only alternative. Nor does he use emptiness as a reason or
a premise in its own right. In short, he does not argue for śunyatā but only against
svabhāva.
Arguments based on the interconnection of concepts proceed in that manner. Our
conceptualizing mind operates by making distinctions, and hence if an entity being
referred to does not exist then neither does its opposite and so there is no real
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distinction to be drawn. For example, if there is no self-existent mover, then there is
no mover who could rest; but since there is no mover, there can be no non-mover
either who could rest (MK 2.15) since the very idea of a “non-mover” depends upon
there being a real “mover.” What is “unpleasant” depends upon what is “pleasant” for
its label and vice versa; so no real entities are involved (MK 23.10-11). So too, if
there is no self, there is no non-self, and so forth. In particular, if there is nothing that
is not empty, then there is nothing empty to contrast it with (MK 13.7).
His argument in the abstract is simple. Whatever topic we are talking about is
either real (sat) or unreal (asat). If it is real (i.e., self-existent), then it is eternal and
unchanging and cannot do anything—it cannot be a cause or effect, cannot be
produced or cease, cannot move or change, cannot have conditions, and so forth. In
short, it is self-existent and not affected by anything else, nor can it affect anything
else that is real. On the other hand, if something is unreal, then it is not a reality that
can be a cause, have a characteristic, and so forth. There is no third possibility if we
remain thinking in terms of “self-existence.” Thus, the field is cleared of alleged
“entities,” and only emptiness remains. Reality as it truly is (yathābhūtam) has no real
(sat) parts, and so it can work precisely the way we see the phenomenal world
actually working.
Thus, Nāgārjuna advances no counter-metaphysics to his opponents’ that he has
to defend. Rather, he simply shows that errors follow from their metaphysical beliefs.
From that demonstration, he believes emptiness follows by default since he sees it as
the only alternative to self-existence. This approach does not compel him to accept
any counter-proposition: he need not defend any alternative if he only shows that
there are flaws in another’s position.9 And one can point out problems in someone
else’s position without defending a counter-position. For example, you could point
out an error in my adding a column of numbers without advancing what you think is
the correct sum. (But as discussed below, this does not mean that Nāgārjuna did not
himself hold metaphysical beliefs connected to emptiness and dependent-arising.)
The important point to note here is that none of these arguments would proceed
without the contrast between x and not-x being exclusive and exhaustive. Introducing
paradoxes as the dialetheists do would vitiate all of them.
4. THE FOUR OPTIONS
One apparent paradox involves a technique that Nāgārjuna employs, although he
never uses the word in his writings: the “four options” (catuṣ-koṭi) (MK 12.1, 18.8,
22.11-12, 25.15-18, 25.22-23, 27.13, 27.20; see RV 106, 115). Here he rejects: (1) A
exists; (2) A does not exist; (3) A both exists and does not exist; (4) A neither exists
nor does not exist.10 Doesn’t the denial of the first option logically commit the holder
9

Nāgārjuna exemplifies a category of debate in classical India in which one can deny a thesis without
admitting a counter-thesis (prasajya) (see Matilal 1998).
10
This is not a fixed form—sometimes we have to put a number of verses together to get all four
options (MK 25.4, 7, 11, and 15); often there are only the first three (MK 1.7, 2.24-25, 5.6, 8.9-11,
21.13, 23.20; RV 37; SS 4, 44; VP 4, 51, 56, 73). Indeed, the very first verse of the Kārikā can be seen
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to the second? How can someone deny that something neither exists nor does not
exist? Doesn’t the denial of the fourth option make Nāgārjuna look as if he is denying
the basic law of non-contradiction?
Philosophers have expended a lot of ink applying symbolic logic to these denials
to try to see how they are not paradoxical.11 But efforts to apply symbolic logic to the
four options miss the point: Nāgārjuna is trying to state that we cannot think of
anything in terms of self-existence. That is, he is arguing that we cannot think
intelligibly in terms of isolated, substantive “self-existent” realities. He uses the form
of the four options simply to try to cover all positive and negative possibilities—i.e.,
he is saying there are no other options. He wants to cover all possibilities so that all
claims involving svabhāva in different contexts are eliminated, and thus by default
only emptiness remains. This approach obviously does not work unless it exhausts all
logical possibilities—only then will emptiness be the only alternative left standing.
But this is possible only if the four options presuppose the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle as the way to exhaust all possibilities. And the
“four options” approach can be shown to be logical and free of paradox easily enough
without resorting to technical rules. For example, if someone asks what color the
number 4 is, we might say “It is not blue, not a color other than blue, not both blue
and another color, nor neither blue nor another color.” All four denials are true and
consistent since numbers do not have color. Each denial does not logically commit
one to affirming another position on a color for four. We might think that the last
option applies—“neither blue nor another color”—but in Nāgārjuna’s framework, as
long as we are thinking in terms of color we are on the wrong track regarding the
nature of numbers. So too, with the four options regarding whether something
“exists”: to Nāgārjuna, only something that is self-existent can exist or not exist, and
so as long as we are thinking of phenomena in terms of “self-existent realities,” we do
not understand the true nature of reality but are still thinking along conventional lines
and thus in terms that cannot apply to the true nature of reality. To use the early
Buddhist analogy, it is like asking in which direction a flame goes when a fire goes
out—any answer shows that we are thinking along the wrong lines (i.e., presupposing
that the flame still exists). So too, for Nāgārjuna only an entity existing by selfexistence could be the subject of the four options, and the denial of all four options is
consistent if there are no self-existent realities.
In sum, the key to this technique is denying the hidden presupposition of the four
options: that things exist by svabhāva. All he is saying is that the subject to each
option does not exist. In addition, he treats the fourth alternative as a type of thing—if
nirvāṇa is neither an entity nor a non-entity (RV 42; SS 25), then it cannot be a
“neither-an-entity-or-a-non-entity” (MK 25.16). Such an entity is the kind of entity
that contrasts with the third option: if we can establish something that is an “x-andas the four options since “no cause” can be most easily interpreted to mean “neither self-caused nor
caused by another” (see VV 51).
11
I too am guilty of applying modern symbolic logic to Nāgārjuna’s thought (Jones 1993, 260-61 n. 6).
But this was done not to claim that this is how Nāgārjuna actually reasoned – it was only to show that
his argument could be shown to be logically valid by employing shorthand modern symbolic forms.
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non-x,” then we can establish what contrasts with it—something that is “neither-xnor-non-x” (e.g., MK 27.18, 27.28). Conversely, if we cannot establish one, we
cannot establish the other because of their interconnection. If we cannot establish x as
real, then we cannot establish its absence (i.e., a not-x) or a conjunction of the two (xand-not-x) or the absence of that conjunction (not “x-and-not-x”). The third option
can be established only if the first two can be (MK 5.6, 12.9), and the fourth could be
established only if we could establish the third alternative (MK 25.15, 27.18, 27.28).
Thus, since x is not real to begin with (since nothing exists by self-existence), none of
the other options are possible. In addition, Nāgārjuna would add that we must reject
the third option because x-and-not-x would be a composite of opposites but opposites
cannot exist together in the same place (e.g., light and dark [MK 25.14]). Thus,
nothing more is needed to explain the four options than Nāgārjuna’s general method
of interconnecting terms.
Another apparent inconsistency occurs in MK 18.8 where the four options are not
denied. Nāgārjuna states: “The Buddha’s progressive teaching (anuśāsana) is this:
everything is real; or everything is not real; or everything is both real and not real; or
everything is neither real nor not real.” The dialetheists treat this as a paradox (DGP
2008, 397.) The third option appears to violate the law of the non-contradiction and
the fourth the law of the excluded middle. But the prefix “anu-” means that the
teaching (śāsana) is not the same for all listeners, but adjusted for different ones (see
RV 394-96, YS 30). Thus, the Buddha might have taught “everything is real” to
beginners, “everything is unreal” to those with some advanced training, and so on—
only the fourth option would be the final truth since everything in Nāgārjuna’s
metaphysics is neither real (sat) nor unreal (asat). Another way to make this verse
consistent (following Candrakīrti’s commentary) is to invoke the “two truths”
doctrine: “Every entity is real from the conventional point of view (MK 7.24), and
every entity is unreal from the ultimate point of view (MK 15.4); every entity is both
conventionally real and ultimately unreal; every entity is neither ultimately real nor
conventionally unreal.” Entities are not real from the point of view of ultimate truth,
but they do exist in the conventional sense, and Nāgārjuna can affirm both claims
without contradicting himself since they are about different matters—there is no
genuine paradox since the same claim is not both affirmed and denied in the same
context. It is like the analogy of misperceiving a rope as a snake: it is indeed both
totally real (the rope) and totally unreal (the snake) at the same time.12 But there is no
suggestion of genuine paradox—that the misperception can be stated paradoxically
does not mean that we think the world is constructed inconsistently or that we must
think about the situation inconsistently. Garfield and Priest (2003, 2) agree that this
apparent inconsistency can be rewritten without a paradoxical form. But this means
that the form does not reflect consistent thoughts, and thus an appeal to dialetheistic
logic is not needed.

12

The analogy is more associated with Advaita Vedānta, but it may have been introduced by the
Mādhyamikas, depending on the age of a certain text (see Jones 2011, 5-8).
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Thus, the apparent paradoxicality of Nāgārjuna’s treatment of the four options
can be explained away. Indeed, by focusing on possible logical matters within the
four options, philosophers are missing the import of the arguments—in short, they
miss Nāgārjuna’s actual reasoning entirely. Nor is there anything about reality that is
inherently paradoxical from Nāgārjuna’s point of view in these passages. The
question is not whether a given verse is contradictory in form, but whether
Nāgārjuna’s thought behind it is consistent or not. That is, can we consistently
paraphrase what Nāgārjuna states without doing violence to his thought? If so, then
the fact that the idea can also be stated inconsistently is irrelevant to how he may have
been thinking.13 Instead, we must look at more of his work to see why he wrote what
he did, and if the overall thought is consistent, then there is no reason to conclude that
his thinking on the four options is an exception and paradoxical even though the form
of its statement is. If so, there is no need to invoke a paraconsistent logic in any way
to understand what he is saying or draw the dialetheists’ conclusion about
paraconsistent truths.
5. THE TWO TYPES OF TRUTH
Many of Nāgārjuna’s alleged inconsistencies disappear through his use of “two
truths.” In the MK 24, he wrote:
[8] The buddhas’ teaching of the doctrine rests upon two categories of truths:
truth based on worldly conventions and truth from the highest point of view. [9]
Those who do not discern the distinction of these two categories of truths do not
discern the profound truth in the teachings of the buddhas. [10] Without relying
upon worldly convention, the truth from the highest point of view cannot be
taught. And without reaching the truth from the highest point of view
(paramārtha), nirvāṇa cannot be achieved.
In Nāgārjuna’s ontology, the phenomena of the experienced world are empty of selfexistence and thus not real (sat) but exist dependent upon other phenomena — that is
the final analysis of reality as it truly is (tattva, yathābhūtam, dharmatā). That is,
phenomena exist dependent upon other phenomena and thus are neither real (sat) nor
nonexistent (asat) because no self-existence (svabhāva) is involved; rather, they fall
in a category (dependently-arisen phenomena) that is outside anything either having
self-existence or being nonexistent. This leads to a clear picture of what he states
about ultimate and conventional truth. In fact, the two types of truth play a central
role in Nāgārjuna’s arguments (see MK 24.36; VV 28; SS 1, 69-73; YS 30-33). Their
13

One implication of Zeno’s paradoxes is that they show that we can conceptualize perfectly ordinary
everyday events in such a way that makes them appear paradoxical or impossible—e.g., that the rabbit
could never catch the tortoise in their race. The world then appears paradoxical if we could not state
what we see free of inconsistencies. But the dialetheists claim that Nāgārjuna thought in a paradoxical
manner and could not state his positions without paradox, not simply that his consistent claims can also
be stated paradoxically if we choose to do so.
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importance is fixed by verse 9: this is the only place in his philosophical corpus
where he points out the “profound truth” of the buddhas’ teachings in this way.
Ultimate truths (parama-arthatas) are truths about things in this world from the
point of view of ultimate ontological status, while conventional truths (samvṛti-satya,
loka-samvṛti) are about what counts as real depending on our conventions.
Conventional truths are determined by worldly practices and conventions (vyavaharas), not just language. In the more informal Ratnāvalī (360-365), Nāgārjuna
contrasts what is “in fact real” or “really the case” (arthatas) with what is “worthless”
or “pointless” (vyarthatvam). Ultimate truths state what in the final analysis is the
ultimate ontological status of whatever phenomenon is being discussed. These truths
are not open to any further ontological analysis, while the subjects of conventional
truths are open to a deeper ontological understanding. In short, ultimate truths are
about the ontological status of such phenomena. The two classes of truth are not the
same, and ultimate truths cannot be reduced to conventional truths, even though they
rely on conventions to be stated, because of this difference of frames of references.
Ultimate truths conceal nothing. Ultimately, worldly phenomena are void of selfexistence and arise dependently—no deeper truth about their status or a deeper
ontological understanding is possible. Any truth stated in terms of entities is only a
conventional one. MK 1.1 on entities not arising is a conventional truth since it is
about the relation of entities; the ultimate truth is that there are no real entities. So too,
the role of entities in the “four options” makes their denial a conventional truth—
from the ultimate point of view, Nāgārjuna neither negates nor denies the four options
(e.g., MK 22.11) since only what is real (sat) through self-existence can be negated or
denied, and so emptiness does not exist as a real entity.
Conventional truths accept our worldly categories, but ultimate truths do not.
However, ultimate truths do depend on our conventions (MK 24.10, VV 28 Comm.):
without recourse to our conventions, these truths could not be taught or even stated.
But an ultimate truth can be stated without reference to entities—e.g., “The that-ness
(tattva) of reality is empty of self-existence and is dependently-arisen.” Dependentarising is affirmed, and according to Nāgārjuna it only works if things are empty (SS
71). Beyond that, Nāgārjuna has little to say about the nature of reality as it is
independent of our conventions (tattva, yathābhūtam, dharmatā). MK 18.9-11 states:
[9] The characteristic of what is actually real is this: not dependent upon another,
peaceful (śanta), free of being projected upon by conceptual projections (aprapañcita),
free of thoughts that make distinctions, and without multiplicity (anānārtha). [10]
Whatever arises dependent upon another thing is not that thing, nor is it different from
that thing. Therefore, it is neither annihilated nor eternal. [11] Not one, not diverse, not
annihilated, not eternal—this is the immortal teaching of the buddhas, the guides of the
world.

In sum, all that can be stated about the ultimate nature of reality is that it is filled with
dependently-arisen phenomena and thus is free of distinct, self-existent entities. (Note
that Nāgārjuna does not mention the that-ness of reality being empty—emptiness only
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comes up in the context of possibly self-existent realities.) He suggests nothing more
positive about the nature of reality as it truly is than that.
Within this framework, Nāgārjuna can maintain both the supremacy of emptiness
and also all conventional matters without paradox. All phenomena are empty, but the
world is still a world of functioning plants and animals, tables and chairs, even if
there are no discrete, self-existent entities; and conventional truths about things’
attributes and interactions can be made. To Nāgārjuna, the world of discrete
phenomena is only a matter of conventions (RV 114). What is real from a conventional point of view is discrete and permanent (and hence self-existent); from the
ultimate point of view, what is real is empty of anything that could give entities selfexistence. Thus, he can negate or deny his opponents’ claims about real entities from
the conventional point of view, even though there is nothing real (sat) to negate or
deny from the ultimate point of view (VV 69). This sometimes leads to Nāgārjuna
affirming something from a conventional point of view, or assuming some
phenomenon to be conventionally real, and elsewhere denying the same thing from an
ultimate point of view. In the conventional sense, there are entities, properties,
relations, and processes. So does a table exist? There are two answers depending on
the context. A table exists conventionally as a functioning unit but not ultimately
(since it is not a self-existent reality). No entities exist in the ultimate sense, but the
table does exist conventionally in a way that a unicorn does not—there is something
there (a that-ness [tattva]) once we remove the concepts that we use to group
phenomena for our convenience. So too, veridical perceptions reveal something about
reality that delusions and optical illusions do not, even while they are erroneously
framed in terms of self-existent entities.
The ultimate truth of the true ontological status of conventional entities does not
deny or negate conventional truths about the relation of those non-self-existent
conventional entities. Thus, conventional truths are truths, and Nāgārjuna never
denies that there are conventional truths—such truths simply do not state the correct
ontological status of things since they ostensibly treat phenomena as “real” (selfexistent) entities. Nor is there any paradox in claiming both that we can use the word
“chair” to refer to a temporary configurations of parts that is functioning as a unit at
present and that there are no timeless, eternal, permanent, unchanging self-contained
entities called “chairs” in the world—both the conventional truth about chairs as
existing and the ultimate truth about the absence of anything permanent and
independent in them can be affirmed at the same time as long as the contexts of the
two claims are recognized. Again, there is no genuine paradox here since statements
are made in different contexts and thus do not contradict each other.
The dialetheists realize that their theory requires the rejection of the distinction
of ultimate and conventional truths: for dialetheists “[t]here is no ultimate truth”
(DGP 2013a, 430). But this immediately raises a red flag. Nāgārjuna clearly emphasizes the distinction of conventional and ultimate: “Those who do not discern the
distinction of these two categories of truths do not discern the profound truth in the
teachings of the buddhas” (MK 24.9). Dialetheists claim that Nāgārjuna contradicts
himself by collapsing the two truths into one in MK 24.18-19: since everything is
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empty, there is no “ultimate reality” and therefore no “ultimate truths,” and so all
truths must be conventional (e.g., Garfield and Priest 2003, 10). That we can speak of
“ultimate reality” was discussed above. Moreover, in saying “Whatever is
dependently arisen, we call ‘emptiness,’” Nāgārjuna is expressing the ultimate status
of the phenomena realm—this is not a conventional truth, nor did Nāgārjuna say it is.
Once again, the dialetheists are trying to create a paradox where there is none.
According to the dialetheists, that reality is empty of self-existence becomes a
conventional truth even though nothing Nāgārjuna actually states remotely suggests
that. That they must collapse the very idea of two truths should be sufficient grounds
to conclude that they are not expounding Nāgārjuna’s thought at all. The context in
which a truth-claim is made remains vital, and without the two types of truths he
would indeed be contradicting himself. However, with the truths being stated in two
different frameworks, one can consistently affirm a claim in one context and deny it
in another where a different sense of “is” or “exists” is utilized. Thus, the “two truths”
approach saves the world from being declared ultimately unreal or nonexistent (only
the idea of self-existent entities is faulty) while making impermanence and
dependent-arising central to the nature of the world.
6. LANGUAGE AND ULTIMATE TRUTH
An “ultimate truth” is a statement that correctly states how things in the final analysis
really are. But in order to generate paradoxes, the dialetheists claim that
Madhayamaka thought is “full” of ultimate truths (Garfield and Priest 2003, 11) but
that these truths are not statable (e.g., DGP 2013a, 426). Thus:
There are no ultimate truths. As we put it before: “Ultimate truths are those about
ultimate reality. But since everything is empty, there is no ultimate reality. There are,
therefore, no ultimate truths. We can get at the same conclusion another way. To express
anything in language is to express truth that depends on language, and so this cannot be
an expression of the way that things are ultimately. All truths, then, are merely
conventional” (DGP 2008, 399).

In short, since everything is empty, there is no ultimate reality and thus no ultimate
truths.
However, simply because there are no self-existent realities does not mean that
another type of metaphysics of “ultimate reality” is not possible—i.e., there may be
another metaphysics of what is real and irreducible in the final analysis. And
according to Nāgārjuna, the phenomenal world may be empty of self-existence and
yet still exist in the final analysis even if it is not real (sat) in Nāgārjuna’s technical
terminology. There may not be any set of discrete, self-existent entities, but there still
is a reality of dependently-arisen phenomena apart from svabhāva in Nāgārjuna’s
metaphysics—what he refers to usually as “tattva.” That is the ultimate reality of the
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phenomenal world.14 The dialetheists have to twist the plain meaning of ontological
terms related to what is ultimately real—“tattva,” “dharmatā,” and “yathābhūtam”—
to permit contradictions about the final nature of reality into Nāgārjuna’s thought. As
discussed above concerning the phrase “ultimate reality,” denying a metaphysics of
self-existent entities (the ontology of svabhāva) does not entail denying all final ontologies of how the world is independent of our conventions.
Nowhere does Nāgārjuna state that ultimate truths are inexpressible or that
anything expressed in language is conventional. Rather, for Nāgārjuna ultimate truths
could be stated. Consider this claim:
•

“The that-ness (tattva) of reality is empty of self-existence (svabhāva).”

That is an absolute truth. It is not a conventional truth but an accurate statement about
the ultimate state of things in their final analysis and is not open to any further
qualification. In fact, the ultimate truth (paramārtha) consists of the teaching of
emptiness (SS 69). Our conventions must be used to state ultimate truths (MK 24.10;
VV 28), but these truths are not thereby reduced to conventional truths—an ultimate
truth still states something ultimately true about the ontological status of things that is
not subject to any further revision.
Nothing in Nāgārjuna’s philosophical corpus justifies claiming that ultimate
truths are unstatable or that from the highest point of view saying “Reality is empty of
self-existent phenomena” is inadmissible because there are no real referents.
Nāgārjuna rejects the “realist” view of language in which words must mirror a
distinct reality to be meaningful.15 For him, words and statements cannot correspond
to reality as it really is because reality is not cut up into distinct objects and thus there
are no “real” (self-existent) referents for our words (VP 53). His opponent in the
Vigrahavyāvartanī accepts such a theory (VV 9): “there is no name without an object
as a referent.” But Nāgārjuna in his response (VV 57-58) rejects that names are
“real.” 16 Rather, his theory is that dependently-arisen names refer to dependentlyarisen phenomena—neither are “real (sat)” but still function – in fact, according to
Nāgārjuna words only function if there are empty of self-existence. Thus, he would
have rejected such mirroring for truths from the ultimate point of view since they are
14

Nor should we view Nāgārjuna through the lens of Western metaphysics of transcendent realities:
what is ultimately real transcends the conventional point of view, but Buddhist insight is into the
phenomenal realm, and ultimate ontological truths are about the same phenomenal realm as
conventional truths, not about an alleged transcendent reality.
15
On the “mirror-theory” of language, see Jones 2016, chapter 6. The danger here is that the
unenlightened will take any term referring to something—“dharmas,” “nirvāṇa,” “emptiness”—as
necessarily referring to something independently real (sat) and thus existing by self-existence
(svabhāva).
16
Thus, Nāgārjuna is an anti-realist when it comes to language: the that-ness (tattva) of reality cannot
be mirrored in language since reality is not cut up into distinct parts that correspond to different
discrete words. However, he is a realist in the everyday metaphysical sense of there being a reality that
exists independently of out conceptualizations, although he has little to same about the nature of that
reality (e.g., MK 18.9-11).
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no “real” discrete objects in the world for our words to mirror (see VP 73 Comm.).
However, what he writes does not justify concluding that he rejects truth-claims about
his ontology of reality as the that-ness (tattva) of dependently-arisen phenomena.
Thus, truths about reality as it truly is can be stated even if there are no distinct, selfexistence real (sat) entities.
The problem for Nāgārjuna is not language per se, but our mental discriminations
(vikalpa) and projections (prapañca) (MK 18.5, 18.9, 22.15, 25.24). Language, like
all phenomena, is empty of self-existence, but it can be used to point out the
nonexistence of self-existence, just as an illusory person can refute the existence of an
illusory person he has himself created (VV 23, 27)—if we did not have the illusion of
“self-existence,” we would not need the illusion of “emptiness.” “Empty words” can
function like every other empty phenomena. However, our mental fabrications can
generate in the minds of the unenlightened a false world of multiple entities.
Nevertheless, Nāgārjuna never gives a blanket condemnation of all language while
offering emptiness as the way to still the mind of vikalpa and prapañca. In fact, all
Nāgārjuna states concerning language relates to three things. First, no real referents
exist in the world for words to denote—names and what is named are entities and
thus do not exist from the ultimate point of view (VP 73 Comm.). Second, concepts
operate by contrasts, and thus pairs of related concepts are interdependent and hence
empty. And third, all statements are empty of self-existence, but they still can
function (e.g., VV 21-22 Comm., 57 Comm.).
Because everything is empty, there is a problem even referring to “selfexistence” or “emptiness.” To have a concept for x, we need something real non-x to
contrast with it. Nāgārjuna would also add that non-x is derived from x; so without a
real x there can be no not-x. Without such a contrast, we would never have a reason to
make up a concept. For example, if the universe were entirely blue, we would see no
contrasting color and so we would have no word “blue” to distinguish the color of the
universe from other colors. Arguably, the word “blue” would have no meaning if we
could not contrast it with something and thus have something specific to apply it to.
(Hence philosophers’ trouble with the concept of “being.” See Jones 2016, 176.) And
since there are no self-existent things, how can there be the opposite (i.e., empty
things) either? Or if nothing is permanent, what could we call “impermanent” (MK
23.15-16, 27.20)? Or if there is nothing real that is conditioned, there is no “unconditioned” thing either (MK 7.33). Moreover, under the mirror-theory, terms cannot
apply if there is nothing real (sat) to denote. Thus, if there are no self-existent things,
then there is no reality that could be empty, and so no reality to contrast with such
things. And even calling what is empty “something” in Nāgārjuna’s eyes means we
are still thinking in terms of self-existence.
This means that what is real is inexpressible from the conventional point of view
of self-existing entities. Hence, the Buddha is the “silent one (muni)” who did not
teach anything real (self-existent) (MK 22.3-4, 25.24) despite all of his discourses.
After a passage on prapañca and vikalpa, Nāgārjuna states that when the domain of
the discriminating awareness (citta) has ceased, then what can be named has ceased,
and that the nature of all things is unarisen and unceased (MK 18.7). But this means
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only that there are no real entities in the phenomenal world to name, and reality as it
is (tattva) is not reflected in language. He does not end the text there, nor does he ever
say that silence is required. Nāgārjuna never states that the enlightened have to
abandon language, even though ultimate truths are dependent upon conventions (MK
24.10). The enlightened can still use conventional language to state the ultimate truth
of emptiness, but they are not misled into thinking that the world is populated with
discrete, permanent entities corresponding to our conventional terms.
It is the unenlightened who discriminate discrete objects (vikalpa) and thereby
create a false world: to them, if we have a word for something, there must be a
distinct reality to be referred to. Thus, they project categories onto the world
(prapañca), the process that creates a false world of reified entities (see MK 22.15).
But language per se does not need to lead to thinking in terms of discrete entities. To
use Bertrand Russell’s example, just because we say “it is raining,” no one thinks
there is an “it” that does the raining—there is just the raining. And the enlightened
can react to all nouns the same way. Language is like a map: a map makes what is
mapped into a flat world of discrete objects with crisp boundaries, while what is
mapped is not actually like that. But this does not mean a map is not useful, and the
same is true with language. The enlightened can use words referring to themselves
without the seeing the world in terms of “I” or “mine” or “selves” (e.g., YS 33). Nor
are labels arbitrary: calling a car a “bottle” or a “pen” is not merely “inappropriate”
but wrong.
Most importantly, Nāgārjuna does state how things are “from the point of view
of reality (tattvatas)”—i.e., from the point of view of how things really are, and not
merely pragmatically from the point of view for gaining the highest fruit (paramaartha). His repeated use of “tattvatas” in the Ratnāvalī is most plainly seen as
meaning that those statements are unqualifiedly true. It is hard to argue that the basic
claim “Reality is empty of self-existence, and phenomena arise dependent upon other
phenomena” is not an ultimate truth—from a conventional point of view, the world is
populated with distinct entities that are realities unto themselves. So too, the principle
“This arises dependent upon that” is not denied even though what arises dependently
lacks self-existence and thus is not real (SS 71). The use of conventions does not
transform the claim “All this is empty” into a conventional truth. The statement
involves our conventions (vyavaharas), as Nāgārjuna states is necessary (MK 24.10;
VV 28 Comm.), but the truth about phenomena being empty is a final, unqualified
truth, and eminently statable. “Emptiness” is only an indicator (prajñaptir) (MK
22.11, 24.18) since there is no real, self-existent entity in the world called
“emptiness” but the concept can be used to point out something true about reality.
Only part of realizing ultimate truths can be pointed out in words (VV 70
Comm.) since an experiential insight is needed. Realizing that reality is empty of
svabhāva is more than merely understanding and accepting the claim—an
experiential insight is to realize that the claim is true and to apply it thoroughly to all
our experiences and thought, i.e., actually to see the world thoroughly through that
perspective. Meditation is required to see that all phenomena in the world are in fact
impermanent and conditioned, rather than merely to accept the claim. But “realizing
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ultimate truth” should not be conflated with “ultimate truth”—the experiential insight
that reality is empty of self-existence may be free of conceptualizations, but this does
not mean that the statement “Reality is empty of self-existence” is not an ultimate
truth. Stating an ultimate truth is not the experience showing that it is true, but it is
still an ultimate truth about the nature of reality in the final analysis, and it is still
statable by recourse to the conventions of a language (MK 24.10). The analytical
mind can comprehend the truths, even if a state beyond the analytical mind is needed
to become enlightened by internalizing the claim into our perceptions and thoughts.
Thus, ultimate truth still involves a conceptual framework but the correct one in terms
of emptiness, and to realize the truth we must forego even this conceptual framework.
As discussed below, the passage MK 24.8-10 quoted above requires both ultimate
truths and going beyond them in an experience. In an earlier Buddhist analogy, it is
the difference between the intellectual acceptance of the idea “Water quenches thirst”
and actually drinking water (Saṃyutta Nikāya 2.115). Quenching our thirst by
drinking water is not a linguistic event—it thus goes beyond what is expressed, and
so the realization is ineffable—but this does not make the statable claim “Water
quenches thirst” in any way untrue. Nor is some other unstatable truth learned by
drinking water. But we now know it in a way that we did not when relying on the
testimony of others—that may change how one views water and understands the
claim, but the stated truth remains the same. The realization may require a state of
consciousness in which our linguistic abilities are temporarily in abeyance. But even
though realizing the final truth is “beyond language” and “ineffable,” stating the final
truth after the experiential realization of it may still be possible (contra Garfield 1995,
252). The truth is not in some sense ineffable simply because all referents are by
definition conventional (contra ibid., 275). Rather, Mādhyamikas could utilize the
conventions of a language to state ultimate truths (as MK 24.10 seems to state
plainly) if they reject the “mirror” theory of how language operates. And as noted
above, Nāgārjuna does reject that theory: there are no “real (sat)” words or referents,
but language can still make claims about what is real (i.e., what is dependentlyarisen).
Nothing in Nāgārjuna’s writings suggests that silence is the “highest truth.” We
cannot conclude from what Nāgārjuna actually wrote that “the ultimate truth is that
there is no ultimate truth” or that “all truths are merely conventional” or that “there is
no such thing as ultimate truth” or that “ultimately, one is left with only conventional
truth” or that “the conception of truth supported by the way things really are presents
a subtle object of clinging” (Siderits 1989, 213; Garfield and Priest 2003, 10;
Westerhoff 2009, 220, 224). We can agree with Mark Siderits when he says “a
statement cannot be ultimately true unless there is something ultimately real for it to
be about,” but Nāgārjuna would reject Siderits’ follow-up claim that “nothing is
ultimately real unless it has intrinsic nature [i.e., svabhāva]” (2013, 378)—for
Nāgārjuna, the that-ness of phenomena in the final ontological analysis is ultimately
real, and it is not completely ineffable: some accurate things can be said about it in
terms of dependent-arising and the lack of self-existent entities. What is ultimately
real is “inexpressible” from a conventional point of view since we think in terms of
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discrete entities and in fact there are none. But from an ultimate point of view, this is
not a problem: the enlightened, in rejecting the mirror-theory of language, know there
are no “real” entities and can resort to language without projecting a statement onto
reality and creating a false world of multiple entities. The ultimate nature of things
may be unknowable in the sense that we cannot know it in the way that we know
objects in ordinary consciousness—i.e., by making an object out of what is real that
we can mentally grasp as a distinct reality. But this does not change the fact that some
of the ultimate nature of things can be stated: the phenomena of the world are empty
of anything giving them self-existence and instead arise dependently upon other
phenomena.
Moreover, if the ultimate truth is not statable, what does Nāgārjuna mean when
he says that ultimate truth relies on the conventional? If he had said realizing the
ultimate truth relies on conventions, then we could say conventional truths only direct
our attention to the ultimate unstable truth, but MK 24.10 states that nirvāṇa cannot
be attained without reaching the ultimate point of view. That is, if we look at the plain
language of the passage, three things are mentioned and distinguished: conventional
truth, ultimate truth, and realizing enlightenment. Thus, he is distinguishing attaining
enlightenment from the two categories of truth (satya [MK24.8]). 17 Realizing
enlightenment may require a wordless experience of the phenomenal world, but this
leaves the statements of ultimate truths untouched, and Nāgārjuna never states that
ultimate truths cannot be spoken. If ultimate truths were ineffable, he would have said
so. (And before the dialetheists say “The description of ultimate reality is that it is
indescribable,” the point can be made consistently: “The characteristic of the ultimate
nature of reality is that is that cannot be described in terms designed for conventional
phenomena—it is free of conventional characteristics, and since those are the only
characteristics that we know we cannot describe it in positive terms.” Calling it
“indescribable” is a second-order claim that only eliminates all first-order
descriptions; it is not a description of a new phenomenal feature.) There simply are no
grounds for dialetheists to claim that ultimate truths are unstatable in Nāgārjuna’s
thought.
7. THE EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESS
A point touched upon in several places above needs to be addressed—the “emptiness
of emptiness.” The rejection of the four options in verse MK 22.11 introduces the
idea: “‘Empty,’ ‘not empty,’ ‘both,’ or ‘neither—these should not be said, but they
are said only as an indicator (prajñaptir).” Emptiness is itself empty (VV 59)—there
is no real, self-existent entity called “emptiness.” “Emptiness” is not a new postulated
substance or a new object seen or a new substantive “essence” of things. Rather, the
term simply describes the state of phenomena as being devoid of anything that would
17

“Realizing satya” can mean either “realizing the reality” or “affirming a truth” since “satya” in
Indian thought has dimensions of both reality and truth. That the concept of “satya” does not
distinguish reality and truth does lead to the idea that if reality as it truly is is inexpressible then so is
truth. But we can distinguish the two components for purposes of analysis.
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give them self-existence or a permanent nature. In MK 24.18, Nāgārjuna calls the
concept “emptiness” an indicator dependent upon convention (prajñaptir-upadaya). It
differs from most ontological terms only in that there is not even a conventional
object as its referent. It differs from most nouns in that there is no phenomenon, either
real or empty, to be indicated by the word “emptiness” while most nouns have some
(empty) phenomena to be indicated in objective reality. But even so, the
unenlightened think that if there is an “indicator” then there is something real in the
world to be “indicated.” But again, the unenlightened will be misled simply by the
term into thinking some real (self-existent) thing is indicated. Nevertheless, like all
nouns, the term “emptiness” can be used conventionally to designate something: it
indicates the absence of self-existence. The enlightened have gotten beyond
projecting our categories onto reality (MK 22.15). They see that “emptiness” is only
one of our fabrications employed to inform us of the fabricated nature of all our
fabrications. In sum, “emptiness” is simply shorthand for existing without any selfexistence.
Thus, Nāgārjuna treats “emptiness” like any other alleged entity: it too is empty.
Hence, the “emptiness of emptiness” is not an esoteric, profound secret doctrine, or a
paradox, or anything mysterious at all. 18 Nor is it a special topic in any of these
works. It is not a new, unique ontological claim or a separate doctrine. It is simply the
statement that “emptiness” is like any other concept—empty of anything that would
make emptiness itself a self-existent reality. In fact, it is an obvious corollary of the
basic doctrine. Hence, Nāgārjuna does not need to say much about it, and he does not.
Indeed, he never used the phrase “emptiness of emptiness,” and yet some scholars
consider it his central teaching. “Emptiness” is as much a convention as any other
concept—it does not refer to any self-existent entity but is itself empty. It is not a
“Cosmic Void” out of which the phenomenal world arises or some new type of selfexistent substantive “essence.” Indeed, it is not a phenomenon at all—the term simply
designates the true state of the world. To reify the mere absence of anything that
could produce self-existence into a reality of any kind would make emptiness into a
type of entity—and according to Nāgārjuna, anyone who does this is incurable
(asādhyan) (MK 13.8).19 The later Mādhyamika Candrakīrti likens the situation to a
man who, when being told by a shopkeeper “I have nothing to sell,” asks the
merchant to sell him that “nothing” (Prasannapadā 13.347).20
18

Nāgārjuna actually used the abstract noun “Śunyatā” very little. He more often used the adjective
“śunya” to indicate that things are without self-existence (niḥsvabhāva). That lessened the possibility
of misconstruing the emptiness of things by reifying “emptiness” into some type of self-existent entity
or substance. The ultimate nature of the worldly realm—its “that-ness” (tattva)—is that phenomena are
empty, not that there is an ontological entity “emptiness.” “Emptiness” merely indicates that nature.
19
Emptiness and dependent-arising are not themselves entities that are dependently-arisen. If they
were, then under Nāgārjuna’s analysis this would lead to an infinite regress of dependent arisings. But
this does not mean that emptiness is self-existent: it is simply a name for what is dependently arisen
(MK 24.18).
20
Again, being “empty” does not mean being “nonexistent (asat).” Emptiness is not a self-existent
reality. It only indicates that phenomena do not have anything that would give them self-existence and
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Yet Garfield (2003, 18-19) thinks the emptiness of emptiness leads to the
collapse of the distinction of the two truths. However, again, it only means that there
is not a self-existent reality called “emptiness”—the term is only an indicator of the
true nature of things. The emptiness of “emptiness” is simply the application of
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy to another concept. Nor does the emptiness of emptiness
mean that there is no ultimate reality in the final analysis about which truths can be
stated. Any paralogical theory that leads to the dialetheists’ conclusion simply must
be dismissed as misguided and only confusing our understanding of Nāgārjuna’s
thought.
8. NIRVĀṆA AND SAṂSĀRA
To generate other paradoxes, the dialetheists rely on nirvāṇa and saṃsāra (the cycle
of rebirth or the entire realm of rebirths) being the same (e.g., Garfield and Priest
2003, 11). However, Nāgārjuna does not state that nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are the same
or identical, but only that they are not different in any way:
There is not the slightest difference of cyclical existence from nirvāṇa. There is
not the slightest difference of nirvāṇa from cyclical existence. The full extent of
nirvāṇa is the full extent of cyclical existence. There is not slightest interval
between them (MK 25.19-20).21
In his philosophy, saying that two things are “not different”—i.e., that there is no
distinction between them (na viśeṣaṇaṃ)—is actually very different from saying they
are the “same,” and it is important to see why.
In Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics, only a truly existing entity can be the same as, or
different from, another truly existing entity (e.g., MK 2.21, 6.5; VV 67), i.e., one
existing by self-evidence, but all phenomena, including nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, are
empty of self-existence. Thus, neither nirvāṇa nor saṃsāra exist in the way that could
make them either the same or different entities. To be the same they have to be real
(sat), but in this metaphysics they are not self-existent and hence not real. In sum,
things empty of self-existence cannot be related as either the same or different. But “a
basic phenomenon (a dharma) that is not dependently-arisen is not seen; thus, a thing
that is not empty is not seen” (MK 24.19). If all this is empty, there are no selfthus make them real (sat) in that sense. This is not to deny that phenomena exist, but only indicates
that they exist in another manner—they are dependently-arisen. That is the nature of phenomena.
21
MK 25.9-10, 13-14 states: “[9] An entity that comes and goes is conditioned and dependent. What is
without conditions and is non-dependent is taught to be nirvāṇa. [10] The Buddha has spoken of
relinquishing both becoming and ceasing. Therefore, it is admissible to say that nirvāṇa is neither an
entity nor a non-entity. ... [13] How could nirvāṇa be both an entity and a non-entity? Nirvāṇa is
uncompounded, but what is an entity and non-entity is compounded. [14] How could nirvāṇa be both
an entity and a non-entity? There can be no existence of these in one place, just as in the case of light
and darkness.” Being without conditions and non-dependent may suggest that Nāgārjuna is treating
nirvāṇa as self-existent, but here he is only teaching that nirvāṇa is not an entity (bhāva) or its absence
(abhāva).

Comparative Philosophy 9.2 (2018)

JONES

62

existent entities (MK 16.10, 18.10), and this includes nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Thus,
nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are neither different nor the same—they are simply not the type
of things (i.e., self-existent entities) that could be either different or the same. Indeed,
the nature of nirvāṇa is the same nature as all things—unarisen and unceased (MK
18.7) since only real entities could arise or end. Neither is a real (self-existent) entity,
and thus neither is found (YS 4-5). Whatever is the self-nature (svabhāva) of the
Buddha is the same nature of the world, i.e., lacking any self-existence (MK 22.16).
Since the cosmos (loka) and nirvāṇa are equally empty of self-existence, how can
there be a real difference between them (RV 64)? Since they are not real in the sense
of being self-existent, they have no marks (lakṣaṇas) for us to grasp that would
differentiate them—only what is real (sat) can have a real mark, and thus from the
ultimate point of view everything is without real marks. Again, this does not mean the
cosmos and nirvāṇa are the same but only that they are of the same nature of being
empty and thus can be neither identical nor different.
In sum, the fact that nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are empty of svabhāva means that they
are not different but not that they are the same. Thus, Nāgārjuna never equates
nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. If Nāgārjuna had wanted to say they were identical, he could
have followed the formula of the Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdya Sūtra on emptiness and form
(rūpa) and said “saṃsāra is nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is saṃsāra” (see Jones 2012, 224-26).
Or he could have said they were the same (e.g., samatā) or some other plain statement
of identity if that is what he meant. But he is pointing out that nirvāṇa and saṃsāra,
like everything else, have the same nature: being empty of self-existence. To identify
nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is simply to miss Nāgārjuna’s ontological analysis entirely.
Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra being empty of self-existence must be a truth from the
ontologically correct ultimate point of view, since conventionally they could not be
more different. The claim is also about their ultimate ontological status. Pointing out
that nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are not the same would not be news to Buddhists—it is
claiming that they are not different that is startling. To treat them as the same would
be as much an error as treating them as different since we would still be thinking in
terms of “real” (self-existent) entities rather than seeing their correct ontological
status from the ultimate point of view. To combine parts of two verses: if all entities
are empty, what is identical and what is different (MK 25.22-23)?22
9. DOES NĀGĀRJUNA HAVE A “VIEW” OR A “THESIS”?
The final verse of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā presents an issue: “I bow to Gautama
the Buddha, who through compassion taught the true doctrine for removing all views
(dṛṣṭis)” (MK 27.30). Is Nāgārjuna claiming that he himself has no views (see MK
13.8)? In addition, in Vigrahavyāvartanī he claims to have no thesis (pratijña) (vv.
22

Dialetheists may suggest that this still introduces a paradox—how could something be neither
identical nor different? But Nāgārjuna’s point can be made without paradox: his metaphysics allows a
category (the dependently-arisen) that is outside what could be the same or different (the self-existent);
thus, being either the same or different does not exhaust all possible ontological options and so
denying both is not paradoxical.

Comparative Philosophy 9.2 (2018)

JONES

63

29, 59 Comm.; see also RV 123 and VP 1 Comm.). In the Ratnāvalī, he speaks of
propositions (pakṣas) the same way (v. 104; MK 2.10; YS 50). However, in the same
line of the Kārikā where he speaks of removing all views, he speaks of the Buddhist
doctrine (dharma). In Vigrahavyāvartanī, he also speaks of emptiness as a specific
teaching (vāda) (v. 69). And in the Ratnāvalī, he again claims to have no thesis to be
defended but proceeds to discuss the Buddhist doctrine (vv. 60, 62). Thus, when he
advances what looks like a metaphysical thesis (“All phenomena are empty of
svabhāva”) and then denies he has any thesis, it has the paradoxical feel of someone
saying “I am not talking right now.” This all suggests that he paradoxically claims to
have no opinions or positions at all. That is, all views, including Nāgārjuna’s, are
relegated to the conventional level: from the ultimate point of view, even the claim
“Reality is empty of any self-existent entities” has to be rejected as simply another
view. In the direct experiential realization of the emptiness of things, all conceptual
views must be given up—even seeing the world as empty—since the mind must be
freed of all conceptualizations.23
However, in the Kārikā Nāgārjuna always connects views to self-existence,
suggesting that it only claims about self-existent entities or their absence qualify as
“views” (e.g., MK 15.10, 21.14, 24.21, 27.1-2; see YS 14, 23, 43-48, 50-52; RV 104).
(To speak of the absence of an entity [an abhava] presupposes that entities [bhavas]
exist [MK 15.5; SS16].) In the more informal Ratnāvalī (43-45, 57-58), Nāgārjuna
also connects “false views” with the idea that karmic causes do not have effects and
“right views” with karmic causes having effects, with right knowledge passing
beyond both false and even right views. But he also connects propositions with
existence (asti) and nonexistence (nāsti) (RV 46, 50-51, 57-58). Equally important,
he also explicitly disconnects emptiness from “views” (MK 13.8), and emptiness is
not connected to “is” or “is not” (MK 22.11; R 46, 104-105), i.e., what is sat or asat.
Under this interpretation (which the Tibetan dGe lug pa tradition endorses),
Nāgārjuna espoused philosophical positions—i.e., “views” in the non-technical,
everyday sense—starting with the first verse of the Kārikā, but he had no views in the
technical sense of a position connected to self-existence. If he had a proposition
(pakṣa), a counter-proposition would be derivable from it, but both would be false
(RV 104-105; YS 50). Nāgārjuna is merely “making known” the emptiness of things
without being committed to any view; the term “emptiness” is employed merely to
inform us of the emptiness of things (MK 22.11, 24.18), not to affirm the existence of
a substance existing in the absence of self-existent entities. He can say he has
established the emptiness of things in detail while still maintaining that this is not a
thesis (VV 59 Comm.) But emptiness cannot be used to refute views (MK 4.8) since
it is only the implication arising from other refutations and not a self-existent reality
itself.

23

Nāgārjuna treats “theses” as realities. Thus, once there is a thesis, a reason presented later cannot
make it “vanish” since it already exists (PV 64 Comm.).
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In this way, Nāgārjuna can accept a particular ontology without having a “view.”
A “view” is not about the “ultimate point of view” but only about having a position
requiring self-existent realities. He also speaks of another type of seeing coming from
the same root as dṛṣṭi when he speaks of seeing reality as it really is—“tattvadarśana” (MK 26.10; see MK 21.14, 27.14)—but he does not connect this to a view.
Thus, he can assert a doctrine and dispute another one without contradicting himself:
he taught a doctrine (vāda) of emptiness (VV 69) and a way of viewing (darśana) and
the Buddha had a doctrine (dharma), but he has no view (dṛṣṭi) requiring self-existent
realities. The alternative to holding a thesis is not another thesis but another type of
doctrine rejecting all theses of self-existence. In sum, the term “dṛṣṭi” is a term of art
for claims of a svabhāva metaphysics, not every type of “view” in the everyday sense.
For the realization of enlightenment, all views in general must be removed, not
merely those connected to self-existence. To realize that emptiness is true—to see
reality as it truly is—all points of view or perspectives must be in abeyance. That is,
we need to be free of all frameworks, including the framework of emptiness, to see
the world as it really is. We must drink the water, not merely have views about its
efficacy. One must go beyond understanding statable ultimate truths (see MK 24.10).
But the truth of Nāgārjuna’s propositions about the emptiness of reality is not in any
way doubted. Thus, when Nāgārjuna says “This world is without self-existence” (MK
22.16), there are no qualifications to suggest that it is anything but the absolute truth
from the highest point of view—indeed, it is false from a conventional point of view.
So too, when he gives the characteristics of the that-ness (tattva) of true reality (MK
18.9-11), there are no qualifications, and the characteristics are again false from a
conventional point of view. MK 26 gives beliefs connected to the standard twelve
steps of dependent-arising. But if “dṛṣṭi,” “pratijña,” and “pakṣa” are terms of art
connected to svabhāva, then propositions such as “All phenomena are empty of selfexistence” simply do not qualify as views or theses in Nāgārjuna’s technical sense.
Stating an ultimate truth involves concepts, but it is not a view (since no metaphysics
of self-existence is involved), and so the enlightened can state it without clinging to a
view.
Thus, Nāgārjuna does not reject all philosophical propositions but only that
directly or indirectly affirm svabhāva and sat. The three important points are first that
emptiness is not an entity of any type or its absence, and so we cannot have a “view”
about it. Emptiness is the conclusion reached when svabhāva has been rejected, and
thus is not itself a “thesis” to be defended. Second, we need to get beyond the
conceptualizing mind—including the framework of emptiness—to see reality as it
truly is. And third, nothing in his works suggests that ultimate truths are in any way
false. Thus, dialetheists cannot claim that Nāgārjuna inconsistently advances the
thesis that he has no thesis or the view that he has no view. Within his metaphysics,
his positions are not theses or views since the latter must presume the reality of selfexistence.
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10. CONCLUSION
In sum, the dialetheists are wrong in their exposition of Nāgārjuna’s way of thinking.
To make his thought appear paradoxical, they have to ascribe claims to him that he
never made. Moreover, simply because we can state his claims paradoxically if we
choose to do so does not mean that he actually thought that way. But Nāgārjuna’s
arguments presume the basic laws of logic and are free of genuine paradoxes. This is
not to say that his arguments are successful, but only that they can be consistently
expressed. We can understand his points without importing modern theories of nonconventional alternative logics or accepting that some irresolvably contradictory
statements actually make intelligible claims. Nāgārjuna was trying to show by a
rather rigorous conceptual analysis and the use of classical logical reasoning that any
metaphysical system that affirms self-existing, permanent entities leads to inconsistencies with what we see actually happening in the world and thus cannot be
accepted. Indeed, logic and the avoidance of contradictions are absolutely central to
how his arguments proceed.
Paradox can be added to Nāgārjuna’s thought only by presenting his ideas
vaguely rather than clearly. This may be true more generally of the dialetheists’
method. To take one of Graham Priest’s examples (2004, 28), consider the situation
when I am standing in a doorway between two rooms with one foot in each room. We
can state this situation paradoxically:
•
•

“I am in this room and not in this room.”
“I am in two rooms at once.”

But these do not state the actual situation clearly and fully. And we have the conceptual resources to state the true situation clearly and completely without paradox:
•

“I am partially in one room and at the same time partially in another.”

Genuine paradox occurs only if we claim:
•

“I am entirely in two different rooms at the same time.”

But this statement is not only paradoxical, it is false and no one believes it or thinks
that way. Since the correct situation can be stated clearly and consistently, to get a
paradox one must confuse the situation with less exact statements. And the same
applies to the situation with Nāgārjuna’s seemingly paradoxical passages: we do not
have to torture what he stated to see that he was being entirely consistent and logical
within his framework of beliefs.
By artificially introducing paradoxes, the dialetheists make Nāgārjuna’s ideas
seem less intelligible than they are. Of course, it is exciting to add paradox to
someone’s thought: it makes something seem more profound and mysterious. And we
do have difficulty expressing ideas at the edge of our knowledge that transcends the
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ordinary or presenting a new way of looking at things.24 More generally, it is certainly
more fun to say “Never say never!" rather than the consistent “Always leave all
possibilities open.” But claiming “There is no ultimate truth, and that is the ultimate
truth” or “The inherent nature of things is that they have no inherent nature” is not
harmless when presenting how Nāgārjuna argued—not only are such claims
confusing, they distort what Nāgārjuna actually stated without paradox and destroy
how his arguments actually proceeded. Simply because we can today restate his
doctrines as paradoxes does not mean that that is how Nāgārjuna actually thought.
Nāgārjuna’s apparent paradoxes can be easily defused, and nothing suggests that any
aspect of his thought can only be expressed in inconsistent terms.
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